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Abstract 
Past literature has indicated the need for addressing information security from both the social and 
technical perspective.  However, previous research has lacked in providing any clear direction for how 
these two perspectives can be brought together in a coherent or holistic manner to analyze information 
security in an organization. Thus, this paper develops a conceptual framework for identifying, bringing 
together, and interpreting the deep-rooted social and technical issues that pertain to information systems 
security.  The framework is grounded in semiotics and is validated by the analysis of a specific case 
study.  Findings in this research indicate that the social and technical elements of security can be brought 
together in a holistic manner via six layers of abstraction where each layer addresses deep-rooted issues 
that pertain to information security.  The output of each layer is then used to inform other layers in a 
collaborative manner creating a final product that contains elements for enriching security analysis and 
enhancing security policy formation. 
 
Keywords:  Information Security, Semiotics, Security Analysis, Security Policy 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
For an organization to secure its information assets, a plethora of both social and technical issues must be 
considered.  For example, Rainer et al. (2007) provides a detailed list of 25 important issues for the 
purposes of maintaining information security.  These issues that include:  confidentiality, integrity of data, 
access control, availability of data, and physical security, are more technical in nature and have been the 
main focus of researchers since the advent of information security research (Anderson, 2007).  However, 
more recently, various social issues have become important areas of focus for ensuring information 
security.  For example, Backhouse and Dhillon (1996) describe the importance of responsibility structures 
being established.  Stanton et al. (2005) describe the importance of positive security leadership and clear 
designation of user roles and responsibilities to create a more positive security environment for end-users.  
Herath and Rao (2009) describe the impact that intrinsic and extrinsic motivators may have on end-user 
compliance.  And Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) present an array of nine fundamental objectives for 
maximizing information security that include issues such as:  maintaining an ethical environment, 
maximizing organizational integrity, privacy, maintaining the integrity of business processes, and 
developing sound management development practices.  
  
No doubt, the literature has begun to recognize the need for incorporating both social and technical issues 
into the analysis and design of securing information systems and for creating sound organizational 
security policies.  Kritzinger and Smith (2008) contend that technical information security issues should 
not overshadow the non-technical information security issues.  Theoharidou et al. (2005) contend that 
information security is emerging into a new paradigm that requires a multi-disciplinary approach.  And 
Dlamini et al. (2009) concludes that new research efforts are required that minimize the gaps between 
social and technical issues.  However, as we move forward to address new challenges that result from 
considering social factors, it is also critical that we continue to improve upon our technology.  In other 
words, to analyze and design secure information systems and to create sound organizational security 
policies, a balance of the two perspectives is required.     
  
However, as the number of security issues increases so too does the complexity of designing and 
maintaining secure information systems.  Thus, a number of researchers have called for simplifying the 
conception of information security via the development of holistic models and frameworks (Eloff and 
Eloff, 2003).  For example, Anderson (2007) presents a holistic model for risk management that attempts 
to merge the roles of executives and security practitioners in organizations.  Zucatto (2007) describes a 
holistic framework that attempts to organize processes that provide a smooth interaction between 
organizational business process, its technological security issues, and social driven security management 
for electronic commerce.  And Kritzinger and Smith (2008) have conceptualized a holistic model (ISRA 
Model) that attempts to enhance information security awareness among employees.  However, these 
models are either too focused on a particular industry segment or have not been grounded via proper 
theoretical investigations.  
   
Thus, this research will provide a holistic and general framework for conceiving information system 
security.  The framework developed in this research is grounded by the theory of semiotics.  Barley 
(1983) comments that semiotics offers an approach for researching and analyzing the deep-rooted systems 
of meaning that lie beneath organizational cultures.  Andersen (1992) believes that semiotics provides a 
theoretical tool to analyze both “soft” areas like interface design and user friendliness along with 
investigating the technical construction of computer systems.  And Braf (2001) states that semiotics 
provides an adequate theory for developing conceptual frameworks to better understand the deep-rooted 
technical and human issues that pertain to information flow amongst complex systems.  Clearly, 
information security involves a plethora of complex issues that involve both technical and human factors.  
Therefore we argue that developing an understanding of IS security via the use of semiotics would serve 
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to uncover the surface-level and deep-rooted issues that may often times be overlooked by security 
experts but are critical to ensuring secure information systems.   
  
Several researchers have taken a semiotics approach to analyzing various issues related to information 
systems.  For example, Nadin (1997) introduced using the semiotic paradigm for designing information 
systems and argued that regardless of whether or not system designers know it, they are in fact using 
various concepts of semiotics when designing user interfaces.  Anderson (2001) discussed the role of 
semiotics in user interface design and stated that semiotics is helpful for positioning the design of 
computer systems in a broader theoretical and philosophical context.  Liu (2002) argued that as a result of 
the inability of users to understand the meanings of words and the inability of analysts to understand user 
requirements, a method with an emphasis on semantics is needed to clarify meanings to enrich 
communication channels.  Sjostrom and Goldkuhl (2003) presented a socio-pragmatic and semiotic 
concept of user interfaces and argued that conceptualizing user interfaces by using the semiotic paradigm 
allows for understanding IS use as social action and understanding how IS artifacts can be seen as 
communicative instruments in such social action.  And Dhillon and May (2006) used semiotics to frame 
an enriched understanding of information security in the context of human computer interaction (HCI). 
  
2 SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
Semiotics is the study of signs and how they are used for information transfer between senders and 
receivers (Pierce, 1948; Stamper, 1973).  More specifically, the field of semiotics provides a structured 
discipline for studying information, information flow (communication), and culture.  By breaking down 
information flow into small units (signs), semioticians are better able to interpret the real meaning that 
lies beneath various forms of communication thus providing a basis for discovering the deep-rooted 
issues that pertain to various phenomena (Barley, 1983; Manning, 1992; Falkenberg et al., 1998).  
  
Charles Morris, an American philosopher, first introduced the field of semiotics in 1901.  He determined 
that signs can be broken down into three layers of abstraction.  Morris labeled these three layers as 
syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics (Zemanek, 1966).  In his book, Signs, Language and Behavior, 
Morris (1955) defined syntactics as the layer that deals with the combination of signs without regard for 
their specific significations or their relation to the behavior in which they occur; semantics as the layer 
that deals with the signification of signs in all modes of signifying; and pragmatics as the layer that deals 
with the origin, uses and effects of signs within the behavior in which they occur.  
 
As the field of semiotics advanced throughout the mid to late 1900s, additional layers of abstraction were 
added.  The semiotic ladder, an analytical tool that was first introduced in the 1970s by Ronald Stamper, 
represents that signs can be studied using six different layers of abstraction. These six layers can further 
be classified into both human and technical level issues (Stamper, 1973; Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990).  
The human level consists of social, pragmatic, and semantic layers, and the technical level consists of 
syntactic, empiric and physical layers.  These layers along with their application to information security 
are shown in Table 1 and will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.1 
                                                             
1 A more detailed discussion of semiotics is warranted but is not presented here as a result of space limitations. 
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Semiotic 
Layer Brief Description Information Security Issues 
Human Level 
Social 
 System of norms, beliefs, 
expectations, commitments, law, 
contracts, values, shared models 
of reality, and attitudes 
Alignment of mission of business, ethical environment, 
social implications, and security policy, with security 
requirements 
Pragmatic Culture, communications, intentions, and negotiations 
Organizational norms and security culture; Education, 
training and awareness 
Semantic Meanings and consequences of human behavior 
Consequences of misinterpretation of data or misapplication 
of rules; Responsibility and attribution of blame 
Technical Level 
Syntactic Rules, procedures, structure, and language 
Software; Security reviews and audits to ensure data 
integrity and to handle program bugs and software piracy 
Empiric Statistical behavior, efficiency, and redundancy 
Telecommunication equipment and network strategies; 
Virus handling and encryption 
Physical Physical domain Hardware; Physical security 
Table 1. Semiotic Framework for Analyzing Information Systems Security (Adapted from: 
Stamper, 1973; Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990; and Dhillon, 1997) 
 
Physical Layer - As shown in Table 1, the physical layer lies at the bottom of the ladder.  Analysis at this 
layer is mainly concerned with modeling the properties of information as input to and output from any 
physical component of an information system.  Thus, hardware issues typically map to the physical layer 
(Falkenberg et al., 1998).  At the physical layer, the term information is generally defined as a collection 
of tokens that have both dynamic and static properties.  A dynamic token is referred to as a signal and a 
static token is referred to as a mark.  The physical layer is thus concerned with modeling these tokens in 
terms of their sources, destinations, and routes over which they are transmitted.  In the context of 
information system security, physical layer analysis requires that the appropriate hardware be determined 
to provide both proper information and physical security of assets. 
 
Empiric Layer - The empiric layer views information in terms of its availability and usability.  That is, the 
empiric layer is mainly concerned with the properties dealing with the transmission of tokens across 
channels of communication.   Thus, telecommunication issues typically map to this layer (Falkenberg et 
al., 1998).  Additionally, the engineering principles of noise, entropy, pattern, variety, redundancy, and 
efficiency would all be addressed at the empiric layer.  In the context of information system security, 
empiric layer analysis requires that appropriate telecommunication equipment and network strategies be 
determined to properly handle the security needs of an organization.  Additionally, virus handling and 
encryption strategies are determined at this layer. 
 
Syntactic Layer - In contrast to the empiric layer, the syntactic layer is not concerned with any empirical 
or statistical properties of information; rather the syntactic layer is concerned with the form and shape of 
this information.  That is, the syntactic layer is mainly concerned with the structure and form of tokens.  
This structure and form is expressed as syntax and requires generally agreed upon rules and formulations 
for consistency.  Hence, software issues typically map to the syntactic layer (Falkenberg et al., 1998).  In 
the context of information security, syntactic layer analysis requires that the appropriate software be 
determined that allows for proper authentication techniques, intrusion detection, vigilance, and the 
maintenance of consistent and available data.  Additionally, proper and timely security review and audit 
strategies are formed to ensure data integrity and to handle program bugs and software piracy.  
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Semantic Layer - As shown in Table 1, the semantic layer lies at the interface of the technical and human 
levels of the semiotic ladder.  The semantic layer is mainly concerned with meanings and is not concerned 
with what language is used, how the message is encoded, or by what medium any message is transmitted 
on.  Semantic layer analysis considers various concepts such as propositions, validity, truth, signification, 
and denotation to uncover a rich understanding of meaning to all concerned with a particular information 
system.  In the context of information security, semantic layer analysis requires that meanings and 
consequences (validation steps) of various security design issues be examined.  Via this type of analysis, 
issues such as the consequences of misinterpreting data or misapplication of rules are determined that 
leads to the formation of responsibility structures. 
  
Pragmatic Layer - In contrast to the semantic layer, the pragmatic layer is not concerned with semantic 
meaning; rather pragmatics is concerned with the intentions of both the sender and receiver in context.  In 
other words, the pragmatic layer recognizes that meanings do not provide accurate or intended upon 
actions or reactions when taken out of context.  At the pragmatic layer, communication is studied 
intensively and is considered to be successful when a meaningful utterance is passed by a sender with a 
certain intention and is interpreted by the receiver of this utterance with the same intention.  As a result, 
pragmatic analysis tends to deal with conversations, negotiations, and intentions of the social aspect of an 
information system.  Pragmatic analysis also helps in interpreting the patterns of behavior and obligation 
afforded by different stakeholders.  In the context of information system security, pragmatic layer analysis 
reveals the need for considering the types of communications and negotiations required within the various 
levels of an organization (strategic, managerial, and operational) to implement various security design 
issues.  At this layer of analysis, education, training, awareness and compliance issues are all considered.  
  
Social Layer – As shown in Table 1, the social layer lies at the top of the ladder.  Social layer analysis 
deals with the consequences or outcomes of pragmatic communication.  That is, when a meaningful 
utterance has occurred, the social layer would be used to identify the social norms that would be changed, 
altered, or affected in some way.  As shown in Table 1, some examples of these social norms might 
include: commitments, law, contracts, values, shared models of reality, and attitudes.  In the context of 
information security, social layer analysis requires that the mission of the business be articulated and 
aligned with a viable security strategy.  Via this analysis, organizational norms, ethics, and the impact of 
implementing various security design scenarios must be considered and used as input for developing an 
enriched organizational-wide security policy.   
3 METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research is to provide a holistic conception of information security via the 
development and validation of a conceptual framework.  As previously shown, this framework (Table 1) 
was developed in Section 2 and was grounded by the theory of semiotics.  To provide validation for this 
framework, a case study was then analyzed.  The case study not only helped in grounding various 
theoretical assertions, but also in identifying information system security concerns.  A discussion of such 
concerns helps in ensuring that all facets of information security analysis are covered.  Validating the 
framework in this manner then allowed for the systematic uncovering of a theoretically grounded security 
analysis and implications for enriching security policy to emerge. 
 
The choice of the case study was largely governed by the intent to develop a richer understanding of how 
various actors and technologies come into play so as to define proper information security.  In this regard 
we proactively sought and successfully gained access to a major hotel and a casino property that had been 
experiencing some information system security problems.  While the management was aware of the 
concerns and some steps had been taken to solve the security challenges, the problems persisted.  We 
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engaged with stakeholders at different levels in the organization to better understand the root cause of the 
security problems.  In the end, 23 interviews with various staff members were conducted.  We also 
established a relationship with one of the key security officers who helped us in validating our findings.  
The study was approved by the University Internal Review Board and systematically followed Yin 
(2003).  That is, key stakeholders were identified; interview strategies were developed prior to 
discussions; ethical guidelines were strictly followed; data was collected and stored in a systematic 
manner; and the final results were revised and verified via the solicitation of rigorous feedback 
procedures.2 
 
3.1 Case Study Description 
For purposes of anonymity, the organization in this case study will be referred to as Tower, a major hotel 
and casino property with six restaurants, four lounges, a pool, and a unique set of tourist attractions.  
Security for Tower is divided into two departments, Gaming Surveillance, and general physical Security.  
Gaming Surveillance is responsible for the observation of all gaming and finance operations in the 
casino.  Security is responsible for the protection of the employees, guests, and the assets of the 
corporation.  If Gaming Surveillance needs physical enforcement of gaming regulations, they call upon 
Security.  Both Gaming Surveillance and Security are run by directors who report to the corporate CFO.  
A separate IT department with several employees and a manager is responsible for handling the technical 
requirements for ensuring information security. 
  
Since the company was founded, the same management has been in place in the IT department. The 
management in Security has been in place since a 1995 expansion and change of ownership. Since the 
expansion, ego and personality clashes created a distinct animosity between the two department 
managers.  The IT manager had on numerous occasions stated that he felt that the manager of Security 
was ineffective and that two different departments were not needed.  In turn, the manger of Security felt 
that IT had interfered with the operation and confidentiality of security investigations.   
  
These continued clashes served to interfere with the daily operations of staff.  In addition to slow 
operations as a result of an inefficient server, in more than one instance it was alleged that information in 
sensitive investigations was leaked to the public or opposing lawyers.  While none of these allegations 
could be proved, security officers often felt unnerved when, while working on a report, they would find 
IT personnel taking control of the “cursor on the screen.”  IT would explain that they were correcting 
someone else’s problems and they needed to test the system. The Security department’s answer to this 
was to create reports using Microsoft Word, printing them and then deleting the report from the system.  
While this created good-looking paper reports, they could not be corrected, added to, or utilized for 
analysis purposes.  This solution also resulted in reports being stored in multiple filing cabinets rather 
than on a secure server.  An unanticipated problem that occurred was that during late-night shifts the 
filing cabinets were not accessible to the security officers. This resulted in felons being released because 
officers could not show Metro Police instances of a person’s prior behavior.   
  
As a result of poor cross department relations, the conceptual model that was held by the Security 
Department was not the same one seen by IT.  Both departments needed to interact with a system that was 
reliable, secure, and cost effective.  Yet, the only thing that both departments could seem to agree on was 
that they required automation.  As a result, various disjointed applications were purchased over the years 
to ensure security.   For example, the IT manager was noted for purchasing a software package based on 
incomplete information.  This led to data being lost as a result of the IT staff not being properly trained to 
                                                             
2 Due to space limitations we are unable to discuss the nature and scope of the interviews or our philosophical stance. 
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enter data.  Additionally, poor software selection led to unauthorized IS technicians looking at sensitive 
security files.    
  
4 RESULTS 
This section will describe the results obtained from analyzing the information security problems that 
emerged from the Tower case study.  The analysis was grounded by using the semiotic framework shown 
in Table 1 as a theoretical basis for discovery.  The presentation of these results is organized by first 
placing the various security problems into their corresponding semiotic layer.  We then begin the 
presentation of our results at the social layer.  As we work down the ladder, we discuss various new 
problems that were discovered and identify problem solving activities for each layer.  Throughout this 
discussion, we bring attention to the need for allowing each layered analysis to inform the other layered 
analyses.  Organizing the results in this manner allows for the systematic uncovering of a theoretically 
grounded and holistic analysis to emerge and provides validation to the framework presented in Table 1.  
Table 2 provides a synthesis of these results.  
 
Semiotic 
Layer Problems Encountered 
Problem Solving 
Activities 
Ego and personality clashes affected the security 
operation of a major hotel casino 
The conceptual model for security that was held by the 
Security Department was not the same one seen by IT 
Social 
Final security solution did not offer what was needed 
• Align stakeholder interest with 
mission of business and viable 
security solution 
Pragmatic Security solution required untrained users to be data entry specialists 
• Ensure proper education, 
training and awareness 
Procrastination and misinterpretation of rules allowed the 
security implementation to fall behind and eventually fail  Semantic 
Unauthorized IS technicians accessed sensitive files 
• Create and enforce 
responsibility structures -
attribution of blame 
IT director purchasing a software package based on 
incomplete information 
Leaks of information to the public and opposing lawyers Syntactic 
Inadequate reports for proper security analysis 
• Enhance software analysis 
• Conduct timely and effective 
security reviews and audits 
Empiric Slow server • Enhance network analysis 
Inadequate hardware to handle increasing data storage 
requirements 
Inadequate storage of reports leading to release of felons Physical 
Lost data 
• Enhance hardware analysis 
• Create enriched data storage 
strategy 
Table 2. Semiotic Analysis of Tower Case Study (Developed Via the Theoretical Framework 
Shown in Table 1) 
4.1 Social Layer Analysis 
As shown in Table 2, three problems were encountered in the Tower case study that required an initial 
social layer analysis.  First, ego and personality clashes between the two directors of Gaming Surveillance 
and Security negatively affected the security operations of this firm.  Second, the conceptual model for 
security that was held by the Security Department was not the same one seen by IT.  And third, Security 
was not provided a system that was truly needed; one that was reliable, secure and cost effective. 
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When considering these three problems in the context of the theoretical framework shown in Table 1, it 
was concluded that Tower should have attempted to align stakeholder interest with their mission of 
business and a viable security solution.  That is, this organization needed to recognize when different 
departments have to work together to achieve the same goal, ego and personalities clashes will inevitably 
cause problems.    Had there been a proper assessment of the cultural norms (investigating beliefs, 
expectations, commitments, law, values, shared models of reality, and attitudes) and political environment 
at Tower, proper collaboration channels (pragmatic issue) could have been established between the two 
departments resulting in a shared conceptual model for security.  This in turn could have then provided a 
proper environment for properly addressing and implementing Tower’s information security needs. 
   
4.2 Pragmatic Layer Analysis 
As shown in Table 2, the Tower case study provided one problem that required an initial investigation at 
the pragmatic layer.  This problem was that the security solution that was provided required untrained 
users to be data entry specialists.  When considering this problem it becomes clear that Tower needed to 
consider the technical capabilities of its existing staff and analyze techniques for correcting this issue.  
Via this type of analysis, a proper plan that aligned the current capabilities of existing employees with 
their current security needs could have then been developed.  
  
When considering this problem in the context of the theoretical framework shown in Table 1, it was 
concluded that Tower should have created a strategy for providing proper education, training and 
awareness of all users.  This strategy would then be aligned with and improved upon in an iterative 
manner by considering the results obtained in the various other layered analyses.  For example, results 
from the social layer analysis enhanced the comprehension of how to align the security needs of the 
organization with various stakeholder interests.  This type of analysis would then allow for a better 
understanding of the social environment at Tower and would lead to an enriched training and awareness 
strategy. 
  
4.3 Semantic Layer Analysis 
As shown in Table 2, the Tower case study provided two major problems that required an initial 
investigation at the semantic layer. First, procrastination and lack of follow-up allowed for the security 
implementation to fail.  Second, unauthorized IS technicians were capable of accessing sensitive files.  
When considering these two problems in the context of the theoretical framework shown in Table 1, it 
was concluded that Tower could have overcome these issues by creating a meaningful system of 
responsibility structures so that individuals in the organization could be held accountable for various 
issues.  A clear designation of who is responsible for what would have then led Tower management to the 
creation of a system for attributing blame thus keeping motivation alive to get the job done right, on time, 
and in an ethical and lawful manner.   
  
4.4 Syntactic Layer Analysis  
As shown in Table 2, the Tower case study provided three problems that required an initial investigation 
at the syntactic layer. First, the IT director purchased software based on incomplete information.  Second, 
sensitive information was leaked to the public and opposing lawyers.  And third, reports were inadequate 
for the purposes of proper security analysis.  When considering these three problems it becomes clear that 
the problem of the IT director purchasing software based on incomplete information resulted from earlier 
problems such as ego and personality clashes and a disjointed conceptual model for security.  No doubt, 
the IT director should not be independently choosing software without a full analysis of what is required.  
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And as has been shown, this analysis transcends a techno-centric perspective.  Had a proper software 
analysis been performed, the purchase of software would have resulted from an organizational perspective 
and might have prevented sensitive information from being leaked and for proper reports to have been 
created. 
  
Thus, when considering these three problems in the context of the theoretical framework shown in Table 
1, it was concluded that Tower should have considered two problem solving activities.  First, an adequate 
software analysis should have been performed.  And second, Tower needed to create a system that 
ensured timely and effective security reviews and audits.  An adequate software analysis should have 
been grounded by the human level issues that emerged at the social, pragmatic and syntactic layers and 
combined with a proper technical analysis.  To ensure that the issues of information leaks and poor 
reports did not occur in the future, a timely and effective auditing strategy for reviewing current states of 
security should have then been created.   
4.5 Empiric Layer Analysis  
As shown in Table 2, the Tower case study provided one major problem that required an initial 
investigation at the empiric layer. This problem was that proper security could not be maintained as a 
result of a slow server.  When considering this problem in the context of the theoretical framework shown 
in Table 1, it was concluded that Tower should have performed an adequate network analysis where the 
efficiency of the overall system was considered.  And again, an adequate analysis at this level required 
considering all of the lessons learned from previous layered analyses and allowing the output from this 
layer to improve upon earlier progress.   
  
4.6 Physical Layer Analysis 
As shown in Table 2, the Tower case study provided three problems that required an initial investigation 
at the physical layer.  First, a lack of adequate hardware to handle increasing data storage requirements 
was noted.  Second, inadequate electronic storage capability of reports led to felons being released.  
Third, important data was lost. When considering these three problems in the context of the theoretical 
framework shown in Table 1, it was concluded that Tower should have considered two problem solving 
activities.  First, an adequate hardware analysis should have been performed.  Second, Tower needed to 
create an adequate data storage strategy.  
5 DISCUSSION 
Several researchers have called for developing holistic models for conceptualizing information security 
where both social and technical perspectives are considered (Eloff and Eloff, 2003; Anderson, 2007; 
Zucatto, 2007; Kritzinger and Smith, 2008).  However there have been problems in the past with defining 
such models.  This was largely because information security is multidisciplinary and any model at best 
helps in addressing issues in part or from a single dimension.  As contended earlier, semiotics offers a 
meta-theoretical basis for defining a holistic understanding of information security.  In this light, we 
defined such a basis and presented it in Table 1.  We then used the concepts therein to undertake a case 
study.  The case analysis not only helped in validating and further refining the framework, but in 
identifying pertinent issues that need to be considered in information security management.  
  
Interestingly enough, the security problems identified in the Tower case study could be described and 
analyzed through the semiotics based framework.  And for each problem that was analyzed, a problem 
solving activity emerged.  For example, social layer analysis indicated that had Tower adequately aligned 
stakeholder interest with their business mission and a viable security solution, then the three problems 
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Employees at Tower 
accessing sensitive files in an 
unauthorized manner 
Social 
Pragmatic 
Semantic 
Syntactic 
Empiric 
Physical 
Culture of Gaining Access 
without Authority 
 
Lack of Ability to Meet 
Security Requirements 
 
Lack of Roles and 
Responsibilities 
 
Creation of Self Imposed 
Rules and Software Patches 
 
Inefficient 
 Operations 
 
Physical Devices Not 
Locked Properly 
 
that included ego and personality clashes, a disjointed conceptual model for security across departments, 
and the lack of a system that met Tower’s information security needs, could have all been remedied.  In 
the literature, ego gratification has been positively linked with information security breaches (see Shaw et 
al 1998) as has been a lack of structure across organizational units (Baskerville and Dhillon, 2008).   
 
As the investigation in Section 4 worked its way down the ladder, the individual layered analyses not only 
served to solve the individual problems at each layer, but were further used to enrich earlier solutions via 
an iterative approach.  For example, it was found that an adequate software analysis should have been 
grounded by the human level issues that emerged at the social, pragmatic and syntactic layers and 
combined with a proper technical analysis.  This result is in-line with Dhillon (1997, pg.37) where he 
contends that human level analysis serves to enrich the picture of the problem domain, and after a human 
level analysis has been conducted, the technical level issues can then be examined to a deeper extent.  
  
5.1 Enriching Security Analysis and Policy Formation 
The results in Section 4 alluded to an iterative approach for enriching information security analysis.  
However, with so many issues to consider, no single security problem was given a complete ladder 
analysis at all six layers.  Additionally, policy formation has yet to be discussed.  Thus to provide a clear 
picture of how the conceptual framework shown in Table 1 can be used to enrich security analysis and 
security policy formation, an illustrative example (Figure 1) will briefly be discussed. 
 
                ANALYSIS                                   POLICY 
  SECURITY PROBLEM     ISSUES                               IMPLICATIONS 
 
           
           
                     
    
      
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       THEORETICAL 
        FRAMEWORK 
 
 
                                                          
 
Figure 1. Detailed Analysis of One Tower Security Problem 
 
Awareness Strategy 
Alignment Strategy 
Create and Enforce 
Responsibility Structures 
Audit and Review Strategy; 
Software Strategy 
Network Strategy 
 
Hardware Strategy 
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As shown in Figure 1, the starting point for any analysis could be the theoretical framework.  Considering 
the issue of employees accessing sensitive files in an unauthorized manner, one can argue that this clearly 
results from a lack of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities.  And as Backhouse and Dhillon 
(1996) have argued, this is a semantic issue.  Perhaps the stakeholders are not recognizing the intricacies 
involved in a clear definition of responsibility structures and are thus more inclined to misinterpret them.  
Past research has shown (see Stein, 2000) that when organizational structures are weak or when the roles 
have not been properly delineated, a culture of lax security emerges (e.g. see Schlienger and Teufel, 
2003).  A weak information security culture essentially means that the business environment is not 
conducive to sustained productivity.  In arguing about the importance of information security as a key 
enabler of business, Dhillon (1997, pg. 137) states: 
 
If we accept that secure information systems enable the smooth running of an enterprise, 
then what determines the ability of a firm to protect its resources? There are two routes. 
Either, a firm considers security as a strategic issue and hence operates in an environment 
designed to maintain consistency and coherence in its business objectives, or, a firm may 
position itself such that it gains advantage in terms of the risks afforded by the 
environment.  
 
Thus, our analysis of information security issues using the semiotics-based framework shown in Table 1 
helps in spotting "hot spots".  These “hot spots” can then be used as a basis to, as Liebenau and 
Backhouse (1990) puts it, "move up and down the ladder" to conduct a deeper and more enriched 
analysis.  For example, Figure 1 indicates that a lack of roles and responsibilities leads to a culture of 
gaining access without authority at Tower which then affords an environment where self imposed rules 
for software patches and upgrades become prevalent. This in turn results in an environment of inefficient 
operations and one where physical devices are not properly secured.  
 
Figure 1 also illustrates how all of these issues generated via one Tower security problem then led to 
substantial implications for an enriched security policy.  Tower’s lack of ability to meet security 
requirements provides insight for an alignment strategy. Their cultural problems provide insight for 
developing an awareness strategy.  A lack of roles and responsibilities produces the need for developing a 
system for creating and enforcing responsibility structures.  Self imposed rules provide insight for 
properly creating audit review and software strategies.  The inefficient operation of Tower’s server 
provides insight for an enriched network strategy.  And the lack of proper locking techniques for physical 
devices provides insight for an enriched hardware strategy. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Information security is becoming a multidimensional discipline where both social and technical 
considerations must be considered in a coherent manner.  Thus, the need for creating holistic models for 
conceptualizing information security in this light has been established in the literature.  As a result, this 
research presented and discussed such a conceptual model that was grounded by the theory of semiotics.  
We then validated our model through the use of a case study.  In addition to validating our framework, the 
problems discovered in the case analysis served to identify a number of problem solving activities that 
need to be considered in information security management.  Additionally, this research indicated that 
when security problems are forced through a systematic investigation up and down the layers of our 
conceptual framework, an enriched security analysis and implications for an enhanced security policy 
emerge. 
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